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CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
JURISDICTION
CHARLES

E. RIcE t

I. INTRODUCTION

HEN A RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT meets with
Congressional disfavor there are several remedies available to
Congress. If the decision is not on a constitutional level, a later
statutory enactment will suffice to reverse or modify the ruling. If,
however, the Court's decision is an interpretation of a constitutional mandate, such as the requirement of the fourteenth amendment that legislative districts be apportioned according to population,' then a statute could not reverse the decision because the
statute itself would be subject to that constitutional mandate as
defined by the Court.
The obvious method of reversing a Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution is by constitutional amendment. But
2
amending the Constitution is a long and problematic process.
Furthermore, the Constitution should be as compact a document
as possible. If constitutional amendments became the common
response to objectionable rulings by the Supreme Court, the Constitution would soon resemble a code of legislation in its length
and complexity.
The disadvantages of the amendment process, however, may be
avoided by the exercise of Congress' power to withdraw particular subjects from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
and from the original as well as appellate jurisdiction of the lower

W

t Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B., College of the Holy
Cross, 1953; LL.B., Boston College, 1956; LL.M. 1959, J.S.D. 1962, New York
University.
1. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
2. See U.S. CONsT. art. V. A constitutional amendment may be proposed
by either a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress or a resolution
adopted by the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. Id. The amendment,
to become effective, must then be ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths
of the states. Id.
The most recent amendment to the Constitution, the twenty-sixth amendment, which lowered the voting age to 18, was ratified in 1971, three months
after it was submitted to the states. In contrast, the proposed equal rights
amendment, submitted to the states on March 22, 1972, has failed after over
ten years to be ratified by the required number of states.
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federal courts. This technique, which has been sparingly used
and is not widely understood, offers a chance to restrain excesses of
judicial power on the part of the Supreme Court without altering
the basic charter of our government.
Congress' power to control lower federal court jurisdiction
stems from article III of the United States Constitution, which
provides: "The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested
in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." 8
Congress' power to make exceptions to Supreme Court jurisdiction also comes from article III, which in pertinent part states:
"[T]he Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make." *
II.

JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS

There is no question but that Congress has the power to define
or even entirely eliminate the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts. 5 Indeed, as Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone stated:
All federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, derive
their jurisdiction wholly from the exercise of the authority
3. Id. art. III, § 1. Article III, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority ....
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction. In all other Cases before mentioned,
the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law
and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.
Id. art. III.
4. Id. art. I1, § 2. For the text of this section, see note 3 supra.
5. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850). In Sheldon, the
assignee of a mortgage bond brought an action in federal court to recover on
the bond. Id. at 442. Diversity of citizenship existed between the assignee
and the mortgagor, but not between the assignor-mortgagee and the mortgagor.
Id. at 440-41. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). Although recognizing
that article III could allow such an action in a federal court, the Court concluded that "courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the
statute confers." 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 448. The Court noted that the result
might have been different had the lower courts been created by the Constitution itself, but since there was no such constitutional basis for jurisdiction, the
federal courts are bound by the jurisdictional limits set by Congress. Id.
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to "ordain and establish" inferior courts, conferred on Congress by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution. Article III
left Congress free to establish inferior courts or not as it
thought appropriate. It could have declined to create any
such courts, leaving suitors to the remedies afforded by
state courts, with such appellate review by this Court as
Congress might prescribe. The Congressional power to
ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power of
investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from
them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress
may seem proper for the public good.6
The Supreme Court has often acquiesced in Congress' use of its
power to withdraw particular subjects from the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts. For example, in Lauf v. E.G. Shinner &
Co.7 the Court affirmed the congressional divestiture of lower federal court jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes.8 In
Lockerty v. Phillips9 the court allowed the lower federal courts to
be divested of jurisdiction to hear civil actions arising under the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.10
It must be emphasized that the withdrawal of lower federal
court jurisdiction does not deprive a litigant of the right to bring
his federal claim. State courts are available and adequate forums
for vindication of rights created by federal law in the event of a
divestiture of lower federal court jurisdiction. State courts are
bound to apply federal law by the supremacy clause," and thus
there is no danger that federal rights will be diluted. Indeed, for
almost the first century of the Republic, the only courts with general jurisdiction over all actions arising under state or federal law
were the state courts. Even with the creation by Congress of
6. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943), citing Kline v. Burke
Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504

(1813).
7. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
8. 303 U.S. at 329-30.

See generally 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).

9. 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
10. Id. at 186-88.
See generally Comment, Congressional Power over
State and Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Hill-Burton and Trans-Alaska Pipeline Examples, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131 (1974).
11. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. The text of the supremacy clause is as
follows:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be

made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
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federal question jurisdiction in 1875,12 the lower federal courts had
concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts. Such is the situation
today.
III.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

Beyond a doubt, therefore, Congress may withdraw particular
subjects from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 13 The
more interesting issue, however, is the power of Congress to make
exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This
remedy has been urged from time to time with respect to various
issues, such as legislative apportionment, 14 obscenity 15 and others.' 6
Currently, there is before Congress legislation which would remove
the Court's appellate jurisdiction in cases involving prayer in public schools 17 and abortion. 18 However, none of these attempts at
removing Supreme Court jurisdiction from any of these controversial issues has become law. Whatever the merits of the existing
Supreme Court rulings in any of these areas, this discussion is concerned only with the existence and extent of Congress' power to
withdraw the Court's appellate jurisdiction over particular subjects.
A. The Intent of the Exceptions Clause
The exceptions clause of article III, section 2, provides that
"the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make." 19 The clause was intended, according
to Alexander Hamilton, to give "the national legislature ...

ample

authority to make such exceptions, and to prescribe such regulathereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. For a discussion of whether state courts would be bound by existing
Supreme Court precedents in the event of a withdrawal of Supreme Court
jurisdiction, see notes 89 & 90 and accompanying text infra.
12. Judiciary Act of March 3,1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
13. See generally Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the
Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis,

124 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1975).
14. See, e.g., H.R. 11926, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).

15. See, e.g., S.4058, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
16. See, e.g., S.450, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (provides greater discretion
for Supreme Court review-eliminates automatic review by the Supreme Court);
S.438, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (eliminates Supreme Court jurisdiction in
school prayer cases).
17. See, e.g., S.1742, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
18. See, e.g., S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
19. U.S. CONST. art. III,

§ 2.
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tions as will be calculated to obviate or remove" the "inconveniences" which might arise from the powers given in the Constitution to the federal judiciary. 20 Much of the debate surrounding
the adoption of the clause centered upon the Framers' concern that
a supreme court would exercise appellate powers to reverse jury
verdicts on issues of fact.21 Although this possibility was the most

troubling to the Framers, the congressional power conferred by the
clause is clearly much broader. This is evident in the language of
article III, section 2, which gives the Supreme Court "appellate
jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact." 22 As Hamilton observed:
The amount of the observations hitherto made on
the authority of the judicial department is this: that it
has been carefully restricted to those causes which are
manifestly proper for the cognizance of the national
judicature; that in the partition of this authority a very
small portion of original jurisdiction has been preserved
to the Supreme Court, and the rest consigned to the subordinate tribunals; that the Supreme Court will possess
an appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, in all
cases referred to them, but subject to any exceptions and
regulations which may be thought advisable; that this
appellate jurisdiction does, in no case, abolish the trial
by jury; and that an ordinary degree of prudence and
integrity in the national councils will insure us solid
advantages from the establishment of the proposed judiciary, without exposing us to any of the inconveniences
23
which have been predicted from that source.
Thus, in purposefully restricting the original jurisdiction of
the Court to very narrow issues, and providing for congressional
20.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 80, at 559 (A. Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1863).

See also id. No. 81.
21. See Levy, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court: A Reappraisal, 22 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 178, 180-81 (1966).
See also Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the Exceptions
Clause, 53 OR. L. REV. 3 (1973).

Professor Brant argues that the sole purpose of the exceptions clause was
to permit Congress to limit the Supreme Court's appellate review of factual
issues. Id. at 11. For a discussion of the state and federal convention debates
concerning the exceptions clause, see 5 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 483 (2d ed.
1836); 1 M.

FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

221 (1911);
1787 530-39

(A. Koch ed. 1966).
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 571 (A. Hamilton) (H. Dawson ed. 1863).
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exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction, the Framers intended Congress to have a broad check over potential "inconveniences" caused by an abuse of the Court's power.
B. The "Negative Pregnant" Doctrine: The Supreme
Court Will Exercise Only Appellate Jurisdiction
Explicitly "Granted" by Congress
The power of Congress contained in article III, section 2, was
broadly interpreted by the Supreme Court, so that a specific grant
of appellate jurisdiction by Congress was construed to imply that
such jurisdiction was excluded in all other cases. This "negative
pregnant" doctrine was enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in
United States v. More,14 where the Court held that it had no
criminal appellate jurisdiction because none had been expressly
granted by Congress. The claimant in More sought review by the
Supreme Court of his criminal conviction, noting that article III
granted the Court appellate jurisdiction over law and equity.
Reasoning that because Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
criminal cases was neither specifically excluded by the Constitution
nor specifically regulated by Congress, More argued that the Court
had jurisdiction over his case. The Court, however, rejected this
argument, concluding that the Constitution was not totally controlling in matters of Supreme Court jurisdiction. Although the
Court's appellate jurisdiction may have been prescribed in the
Constitution, the Court held that Congress' power to regulate
jurisdiction must be understood to prohibit the exercise of jurisdiction unless Congress had explicitly granted it to the Court.
Speaking for the More Court, Chief Justice Marshall stated that
"as the jurisdiction of the Court has been described [in the Constitution], it has been regulated by Congress and an affirmative
description of its powers must be understood as a regulation, under
the Constitution, prohibiting the exercise of other powers than
those described." 25
24. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805).

25. Id. at 172. Marshall compared Congress's ability to control Supreme
Court jurisdiction with its power to determine the "amount in controversy"
requirement, stating:
Thus, the appellate jurisdiction of this court, from the judgments
of the circuit courts, is described affirmatively; no restrictive words are
used. Yet, it has never been supposed, that a decision of a circuit
court could be reviewed, unless the matter in dispute should exceed
the value of $2,000. There are no words in the act, restraining the
Supreme Court from taking cognizance of causes under that sum;
their jurisdiction is only limited by the legislative declaration, that
they may re-examine the decisions of the circuit court, where the
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COURT'S JURISDICTION

Marshall further explained that the exceptions clause did not
merely give Congress the power to make exceptions to the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction, but it also implicitly mandated that the
Supreme Court possessed only that jurisdiction specifically granted
by Congress. Marshall stated:
When the Constitution has given Congress power to
limit the exercise of our jurisdiction, and to make regulations respecting its exercise; and Congress, under that
power, has proceeded to erect inferior courts, and has
said in what cases a writ of error or appeal shall lie, an
exception of all other cases is implied. And this court is
26
as much bound by an implied as an express exception.
It is interesting to note that criminal cases were not appealable
to the Supreme Court until 1891. This was simply because until
then Congress had not specified that they could be so appealed.
With regard to its power to review criminal cases, the Supreme
Court noted: "The appellate jurisdiction of this court rests wholly
on the acts of Congress." 27
This broad interpretation of Congressional control over
Supreme Court jurisdiction was first advanced in 1796 by Chief
Justice Ellsworth, who had been a member of the Constitutional
Convention's Committee on Detail which drafted the exceptions
clause. 28

In Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 29 Ellsworth said:

"The constitution, distributing the judicial power of
the U.S., vests in the Supreme Court, an original as well
matter in dispute exceeds the value of $2,000.

This court, therefore,

will only review those judgments of the circuit court of Columbia, a
power to re-examine which, is expressly given by law.
Id. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1976).
26. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 170. See also Ex Parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S.
(IWall.) 243 (1863). The Vallandigham Court applied the "negative pregnant" doctrine, stating: "[A]ffirmative words in the Constitution, declaring in

what cases the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction must be construed negatively as to all other cases." Id. at 252.
27. United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 319 (1892). See also United
States v. Cross, 145 U.S. 571 (1892); Ex Parte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328 (1885).

28. The Convention's Committee on Detail also included John Rutledge,
Edmund Randolph, Nathaniel Gorham, and James Wilson. See Merry, Scope
of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: The Historical Basis, 47

MINN.

53, 57 (1962).
29. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796). It is interesting to note that of the six
judges on the Wiscart Court, two of them-James Wilson and Oliver Ellsworth-were members of the 1787 Committee on Detail which drafted the
exceptions clause. See note 28 supra. Ellsworth and William Patterson,
another member of the Wiscart Court, drafted the Judiciary Act of 1789. See
Brant, supra note 21, at 13.
L.

REV.
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as appellate jurisdiction. . . . Here, then, is the ground,
and the only ground, on which we can sustain an appeal.
If Congress has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise our appellate jurisdiction;
and if the rule is provided, we cannot depart from it. The
question, therefore, on the constitutional point of appellate jurisdiction, is simply, whether Congress has established any rules for regulating its exercise." 80
In 1810, in Durousseau v. United States,3 ' Chief Justice Marshall again emphasized that the Court is bound by implied exceptions to its appellate jurisdiction, so that, in effect, it can exercise
jurisdiction only where expressly granted by Congress:
The appellate powers of this Court are not given by
the judicial act. They are given by the constitution. But
they are limited and regulated by the judicial act, and by
such other acts as have been passed on the subject. When
the first legislature of the Union proceeded to carry the
third article of the constitution into effect, they must be
understood as intending to execute the power they
possessed of making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. They have not, indeed,
made these exceptions in express terms. They have not
declared, that the appellate power of the Court shall not
extend to certain cases; but they have described affirmatively its jurisdiction, and this affirmative description has
been understood to imply a negative on the exercise of
such appellate power as is not comprehended within it.
The spirit as well as the letter of a statute must be
respected, and where the whole context of the law demonstrates a particular intent in the legislature to effect a
certain object, some degree of implication may be called
in to aid that intent. It is upon this principle, that the
court implies a legislative exception from its constitutional
appellate power, in the legislative affirmative description
3 2
of those powers.
30. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 327. Wiscart involved the Supreme Court's competency to review findings of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury. Id.
at 321-22. Justice Wilson's dissent argued that the Court's constitutional jurisdiction provided for a limited form of factual review. Id. at 325 (Wilson, J.,
dissenting). The majority concluded, however, that all appellate powers of
the Court, including review of factual issues, must be expressly granted by
Congress. Id. at 327.
31. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810).
32. Id. at 313-14. Marshall's views, after More and Durousseau, appeared
to be that:
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Similarly, when Chief Justice Taney spoke to the issue in
Barry v. Mercein,33 he said: "By the constitution of the United
States, the Supreme Court possesses no appellate power in any case,
unless conferred upon it by act of Congress; nor can it when conferred be exercised in any other form, or by any other mode of
proceeding than that which the law prescribes." 4
C. The McCardle Case
Prior to Ex Parte McCardle 25 in 1868, the Supreme Court was
never called upon to decide the validity of an act of Congress which
made a specific exception to its appellate jurisdiction. McCardle,
a Mississippi editor, was imprisoned by the federal reconstruction
authorities on account of seditious statements he had made. Seeking a writ of habeas corpus, McCardle asked the federal circuit
court to rule that his detention was invalid. When his petition
was denied he appealed to the Supreme Court under a statute which
specifically permitted such appeals.3 6 After the Supreme Court
(1) Congress has a wide discretion in legislating exceptions to the
constitutional jurisdiction of the Court; (2) if Congress does not exercise that discretion the Court retains its full constitutional jurisdiction;
[and] (3) if Congress exercises the discretion by specifying the cases to
which the jurisdiction extends, those cases not designated are impliedly excepted.
Ratner, CongressionalPower Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 177 (1960).
33. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847). Barry involved Supreme Court review of
a lower court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus in a child custody case. Id.
at 118-19. The appellant's estranged wife lived with the couple's daughter in
New York, while the appellant, a British citizen, lived in Canada. Id. at 104,
119. The lower court, reasoning that the value of custody of the child was
not quantifiable in monetary terms, determined that it had no jurisdiction over
the case since the requisite $2,000 amount in controversy was not present. Id.
at 119. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that since its jurisdiction
could only be based upon review of a lower court decision, it had no jurisdiction to issue the writ. Id. at 119-20.
34. Id. at 119. See also St. Louis, I.M. & S. R.R. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281
(1908); United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 (1908); Colorado Cent. Consol.
Mining Co. v. Turck, 150 U.S. 138 (1893); United States v. Cross, 145 U.S. 571
(1892); National Exch. Bank v. Peters, 144 U.S. 571 (1892); United States v.
Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892); United States v. Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328 (1885);
United States v. Young, 94 U.S. 258 (1876); Daniels v. Railroad Co., 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 250 (1865); Ex Parte Vallandigham 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863);
Forsyth v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 570 (1850).
35. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). See generally Van Alstyne, A Critical
Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973).
36. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 507. The United States Constitution provides:
"The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. For an historical account of the development of the
writ, see Van Alstyne, supra note 35, at 233-36.
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heard argument on the case and while the Court was deliberating,
Congress, fearing an unfavorable decision, enacted a statute repealing that part of the prior statute which had given the Supreme
Court jurisdiction to hear such appeals from the circuit court.8 7
The Court, in confronting for the first time the issue of a positive
congressional exception to its appellate jurisdiction, dismissed the
appeal for want of jurisdiction, even though the case had already
been argued and was before the Court.
The Court first discussed and reaffirmed Marshall's "negative
pregnant" doctrine. 8 The Court noted, however, that the exceptions clause provides not only for implicit divestiture of Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction, but also for the more specific and
direct explicit exceptions to jurisdiction. The Court stated:
The exception to appellate jurisdiction in the case
before us, however, is not an inference from the affirma37. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 508. The repealed statute, designed to assure
quick release of Union sympathizers held in southern jails after the Civil War,
provided that federal courts were empowered to grant writs of habeas corpus
"in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in
violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States."
Id. at 507. The statute provided for appeals to the federal circuit courts and
to the Supreme Court. Id.
38. Id. at 513. Although the negative pregnant doctrine was inapplicable
to the facts of the case, the Court reaffirmed its validity, stating:
It is unnecessary to consider whether, if Congress had made no
exceptions and no regulations, this court might not have exercised
general appellate jurisdiction under rules prescribed by itself. For
among the earliest acts of the first Congress, at its first session, was the
act of September 24th, 1789, to establish the judicial courts of the
United States. That act provided for the organization of this court,
and prescribed regulations for the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The source of that jurisdiction, and the limitations of it by the
Constitution and by statute, have been on several occasions subjects
of consideration here. In the case of Durousseau v. The United
States, particularly, the whole matter was carefully examined, and the
court held, that while "the appellate powers of this court are not
given by the Constitution," they are, nevertheless, "limited and
regulated by that act, and by such other acts as have been passed on
the subject." ...
"They [the Congress] have described our jurisdiction affirmatively,"
.. . and this affirmative description has been understood to imply a
"negation of the exercise of such appellate power as is not comprehended within it."
The principle that the affirmation of appellate jurisdiction implies
the negation of all such jurisdiction not affirmed having been thus
established, it was an almost necessary consequence that acts of
Congress, providing for the exercise of jurisdiction, should come to
be spoken of as acts granting jurisdiction, and not as acts making
exceptions to the constitutional grant of it.
Id. at 513-14. For further discussion of the negative pregnant doctrine, see
notes 24-34 and accompanying text supra.
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tion of other appellate jurisdiction. It is made in terms.
The provision of the act of 1867, affirming the appellate
jurisdiction of this court in cases of habeas corpus is expressly repealed. It is hardly possible to imagine a plainer
instance of positive exception.
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of
the legislature. We can only examine into its power under
the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to
the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express
words. .

.

.

Without jurisdiction the court cannot pro-

ceed at all in any case. Jurisdiction is power to declare
the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and
dismissing the case. And this is not less clear upon authority than upon principle.3 9
It is true that the statute upheld in McCardle did not bar the
Supreme Court from reviewing all habeas corpus cases. Rather, it
only barred review sought under the 1867 statute which had provided one avenue of review of such cases from the circuit court.
The Supreme Court retained the habeas corpus review power which
had been given it by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and which Congress
had chosen not to withdraw. Chief Justice Chase observed for the
Court in McCardle:
It is quite clear, therefore, that this court cannot proceed to pronounce judgment in this case, for it has no
longer jurisdiction of the appeal; and judicial duty is not
less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction
than in exercising firmly that which the Constitution and
the laws confer.
Counsel seems to have supposed, if effect be given to
the repealing act in question, that the whole appellate
power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus, is denied.
But this is an error. The act of 1868 does not affect the
40
jurisdiction which was previously exercised.
39. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514. One commentator has stated:
more than a century old, McCardle still stands as the leading case
the extent to which Congress may use the exceptions clause to oust
of its appellate power even as to the substantive constitutionality
Congress." Van Alstyne, supra note 35, at 232.
40. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515.

"Though
regarding
the Court
of acts of

Professor Van Alstyne argued that the

alternative basis in the Judiciary Act of 1789 for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus supports a narrow reading of McCardle. See Van Alstyne,
supra note 35, at 258. The limited reading of McCardle advocated by Professor Van Alstyne is that the decision was based not upon Congress' exceptions clause power, but rather upon Congress' power to enact and repeal
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Later in that same year, the Court made this distinction in
Ex parte Yerger.41 On facts very similar to McCardle, Yerger requested the Supreme Court to issue its own writ of habeas corpus
to the circuit court, as authorized by the Judiciary Act of 1789.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Chase,
the author of the McCardle opinion, held that the 1868 statute
had left untouched the Supreme Court's power to issue a writ of
habeas corpus to a lower court as provided in the Judiciary Act
of 1789.42 However, there was no indication in Yerger that the
Court would not have upheld an act withdrawing appellate jurisdiction in all habeas corpus cases from the Court. Although the
Court in Yerger indicated that such a result would not lightly be
presumed and that such a statute would be narrowly construed, 43
the Court acknowledged that it was within Congress' power. When
discussing the power of Congress to limit jurisdiction, as evidenced
by the Repealer Act of 1868, the Yerger Court noted:
The effect of the act was to oust the court of its jurisdiction of the particular case then before it on appeal,
and it is not to be doubted that such was the effect intended. Nor will it be questioned that legislation of this
character is unusual and hardly to be justified except upon
some imperious public exigency.
It was, doubtless, within the constitutional discretion
of Congress to determine whether such an exigency
existed; but it is not to be presumed that an act, passed
under such circumstances, was intended to have any fur44
ther effect than that plainly apparent from its terms.
jurisdictional statutes. Id. at 249-50. Thus, as Professor Van Alstyne interpreted McCardle, the Repealer Act only eliminated a right of access conferred
upon a special class of litigants rather than effect a general withdrawal of
Supreme Court jurisdiction. Id. at 250. Consequently, neither the constitutional right to habeas corpus nor the statutory provisions of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 were involved. Id. at 251-54. Professor Van Alstyne concedes,
however, that McCardle is the leading decision in an unwavering line of cases
acknowledging the powers of Congress to withdraw jurisdiction through the
exceptions clause. Id. at 255.
41. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).

42. Id. at 105. The Court stated that the 1868 repealer statutes "do not
purport to touch the appellate jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution, or
to except from it any cases not excepted by the Act of 1789. They reach no
act except the act of 1867." Id.
43. Id. at 103. The Court cautioned that to except all habeas corpus
jurisdiction would "greatly weaken the efficacy of the writ, deprive the citizen
in many cases of its benefits, and seriously hinder the establishment of that
uniformity in deciding upon questions of personal rights which can only be
attained through appellate jurisdiction." Id.
44. Id. at 104.
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D. The Klein Case
Four years later, in United States v. Klein, 45 the Court had
occasion to spell out an important limitation to Congress' power
under the exceptions clause. Klein is the only Supreme Court
decision ever to strike down a statute enacted under the exceptions
clause. The claimant in Klein, who had been a Confederate, sued
in the Court of Claims to recover the proceeds from the sale of his
property seized and sold by the Union forces. Because he had received a full presidential pardon for his Confederate activities, the
Court of Claims ruled in his favor. If he had not received a
pardon, the governing statute would have prevented his recovery.
While the appeal of his case was pending before the Supreme
Court, Congress enacted a statute which provided that whenever it
appeared that a judgment of the Court of Claims had been founded
on a presidential pardon, without other proof of loyalty, the
Supreme Court should have no further jurisdiction of the case.
The statute further declared that every pardon granted to a suitor
in the Court of Claims which recited that he has been guilty of any
act of rebellion or disloyalty, shall, if accepted by him in writing
without disclaimer of those recitals, be taken as conclusive evidence
of such act of rebellion or disloyalty and his suit shall be dismissed. 4 While declaring the statute unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court expressly reiterated that Congress does have the power to
deny appellate jurisdiction "in a particular class of cases":
Undoubtedly the legislature has complete control
over the organization and existence of that [Supreme]
court and may confer or withhold the right of appeal
from its decisions. And if this act did nothing more, it
would be our duty to give it effect. If it simply denied
the right of appeal in a particular class of cases, there
could be no doubt that it must be regarded as an exercise
of the power of Congress to make "such exceptions from
the appellate jurisdiction" as should seem to it expedient.
But the language of the proviso shows plainly that it
does not intend to withhold appellate jurisdiction except
as a means to an end. Its great and controlling purpose is
to deny to pardons granted by the President the effect
which this court had adjudged them to have. The proviso declares that pardons shall not be considered by this
court on appeal. We have already decided that it was
45. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
46. Id. at 143-44.
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our duty to consider them and give them effect, in cases
like the present, as equivalent to proof of loyalty. It provides that whenever it shall appear that any judgment of
the Court of Claims shall have been founded on such

pardons, without other proof of loyalty, the Supreme
Court shall have no further jurisdiction of the case and
shall dismiss the same for want of jurisdiction. The proviso further declares that every pardon granted to any
suitor in the Court of Claims and reciting that the person
pardoned has been guilty of any act of rebellion or disloyalty, shall, if accepted in writing without disclaimer
of the fact recited, be taken as conclusive evidence in that
court and on appeal, of the act recited; and on proof of
pardon or acceptance, summarily made on motion or
otherwise, the jurisdiction of the court shall cease and the
suit shall be forthwith dismissed.
It is evident from this statement that the denial of
jurisdiction to this court, as well as to the Court of Claims,
is founded solely on the application of a rule of decision,
in causes pending, prescribed by Congress. The court has
jurisdiction of the cause to a given point; but when it
ascertains that a certain state of things exists, its jurisdiction is to cease and it is required to dismiss the cause
for want of jurisdiction.
It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the
acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and
prescribe regulations to the appellate power.
The court is required to ascertain the existence of
certain facts and thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction
on appeal has ceased, by dismissing the bill. What is this
but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a
particular way? 47

The statute in Klein attempted to dictate the outcome of a
particular class of cases, under the guise of limiting the Court's
jurisdiction. The Court lost jurisdiction only when the Court of
Claims judgment was founded on a particular type of evidence,
that is, a pardon. The statute further prescribed that the effect
of the pardon would be such that the recitals in the pardon of
acts of rebellion and disloyalty would be conclusive proof of those
acts. This was an intrusion upon the judicial process and an
effort to dictate the rules to be used in deciding cases. 48 Moreover,
47. Id. at 145-46 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 145-46. That Klein was an assertion by the Court of the
independence of the judiciary has been recognized by the commentators. See,
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the statute in Klein intruded upon the President's pardoning power
by attempting "to deny to pardons granted by the President the
effect which this court had adjudged them to have." 49 In these
major respects the statute involved in Klein was wholly different
from a statute simply withdrawing appellate jurisdiction over a
certain class of cases. As the Court said in the Klein case itself:
"There could be no doubt that a denial of the right of appeal in
a particular class of cases" would be within Congress' power under
the exceptions clause. °
E. Supreme Court Statements Since 1872
Since Klein, the Supreme Court has not had occasion to further
define the limits of the exceptions clause. In The Francis Wright
case,"1 the Court upheld a statute under which the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in admiralty cases was limited to
determination of questions of law rather than of issues of fact.
Chief Justice Waite in his opinion for the Court said that:
What the "appellate powers" of the Supreme Court
"shall be," and to what extent they shall be exercised, are,
and always have been, proper subjects of legislative control. Authority to limit the jurisdiction necessarily carries with it authority to limit the use of the jurisdiction.
Not only may whole classes of cases be kept out of the
jurisdiction altogether, but particular classes of questions
may be subjected to re-examination and review, while
others are not. To our minds it is no more unconstitutional to provide that issues of fact shall not be retried
in any case, than that neither issues or law nor fact shall
be retried in cases where the value of the matter in dispute
is less than $5,000. The general power to regulate implies
power to regulate in all things. The whole of a civil law
appeal may be given, or a part. The constitutional requirements are all satisfied if one opportunity is had for
the trial of all parts of a case. Everything beyond that is
52
matter of legislative discretion, not of constitutional right.
e.g., Ratner, supra note 32 at 181; Note, The Nixon Busing Bills and Congressional Power, 81 YALE L.J. 1542, 1557 (1972).
49. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145. The Court wrote: "Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
power." Id. at 147.
50. Id. at 145.
51. 105 U.S. 381 (1881).
52. Id. at 386. The Court again analogized Congress' power to control

Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction with Congress' ability to establish a
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In his opinion Chief Justice Waite referred to "the rule, which
has always been acted on since, that while the appellate power of
this court under the Constitution extends to all cases within the
judicial power of the United States, actual jurisdiction under the
power is confined within such limits as Congress sees fit to prescribe." 53 Statements of several individual justices in the intervening years reinforce this conclusion. Justice Frankfurter, in his
54
dissenting opinion in National Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Co.,
noted that:
Congress need not establish inferior courts; Congress
need not grant the full scope of jurisdiction which it is
empowered to vest in them; Congress need not give this
Court any appellate power; it may withdraw appellate
jurisdiction once conferred and it may do so even while a
case is sub judice.55
In Glidden v. Zdanok, 6 while discussing the power of Congress
over Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, Justice Harlan stated:
Congress has on occasion withdrawn jurisdiction from
the Court of Claims to proceed with the disposition of
cases pending therein, and has been upheld in so doing by
this Court. . . . But that is not incompatible with the
possession of Article III judicial power by the tribunal
affected. Congress has consistently with that article withdrawn the jurisdiction of this Court to proceed with a case
then sub judice, Ex parte McCardle ... ; its power can be
no less when dealing with an inferior federal court. . ..
For as Hamilton assured those of his contemporaries who
were concerned about the reach of power that might be
vested in a federal judiciary, "it ought to be recollected
that the national legislature will have ample authority to
make such exceptions, and to prescribe such regulations
minimum amount in controversy as a prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.
Id.

See note 25 supra. The Court noted that there was no right to appellate

review by the Supreme Court, since it is "amatter of legislative discretion, not
of constitutional right." 105 U.S. at 386. See also Luckenback S.S. Co. v.
United States, 272 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1926).
53. 105 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added).
54. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).

55. Id. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

Luckenback S.S. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 533, 536 (1926).

Brant, supra note 21, at 28; Merry, supra note 28, at 53.
56. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).

See also

See generally
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as will be calculated to obviate or remove [any] . . .inconveniences." 57

Justice William 0. Douglas, in his dissent in Glidden, expressed some doubt about the continuing vitality of Ex parte
McCardle. Referring to Justice Harlan's opinion in Glidden,
Justice Douglas said:
First, that opinion cites with approval Ex parte
McCardle, .

.

. in which Congress withdrew jurisdiction

of this Court to review a habeas corpus case that was sub
judice, and then apparently draws a distinction between
that case and United States v. Klein .... where such with-

drawal was not permitted in a property claim. There is
a serious question whether the McCardle case could command a majority view today. Certainly the distinction
between liberty and property (which emanates from this
portion of my Brother Harlan's opinion)5 has no vitality
even in terms of the Due Process Clause. A
In his concurring opinion in Flast v. Cohen,59 in 1968, however, Justice Douglas appeared to have resolved his doubts in favor
of the continued vitality of McCardle: "As respects our appellate
jurisdiction, Congress may largely fashion it as Congress desires by
reason of the express provisions of Section 2, Article III." 60
F. The Meaning of the Exceptions Clause
In summary, the exceptions clause is clear, unambiguous, and
unqualified. The decisions of the Supreme Court and the state57. Id. at 567-68 (citations omitted). Justice Harlan did note that Congress' authority to limit Supreme Court jurisdiction was not boundless, stating:
The authority is not, of course, unlimited. In 1870, Congress
purported to withdraw jurisdiction from the Court of Claims and
from this Court on appeal over cases seeking indemnification for
property captured during the Civil War, so far as eligibility therefor
might be predicated upon an amnesty awarded by the President, as
both courts had previously held that it might. Despite Ex parte
McCardle, the Court refused to apply the statute to a case in which
the claimant had already been adjudged entitled to recover by the
Court of Claims, calling it an unconstitutional attempt to invade
the judicial province by prescribing a rule of decision in a pending
case.
Id. at 570, citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
58. 370 U.S. at 605 n.l1 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
59. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
60. Id. at 109 (Douglas, J., concurring), citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
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ments of its justices have expressly recognized the plain meaning
of the clause as conferring upon Congress' broad powers to limit
the Court's jurisdiction. Indeed, this power has been so expansively interpreted by the Court that an exception will be implied
in cases where Congress has not specifically "granted" appellate
jurisdiction to the Court.
III. OBJECTIONS TO THE EXERCISE OF POWER UNDER
THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE:
ROLE"

THE "ESSENTIAL

ARGUMENT

The text of article III, section 2, explicitly and unmistakably
gives to Congress the power to withdraw certain subjects from the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. The obvious reading of
the entire text of article III is that this power was given to Congress, not capriciously, but as an integral part of a system of checks
and balances. Through the exceptions clause, Congress was given
the power, in Hamilton's words "to obviate or remove" the "inconveniences" arising from the judicial power. 61 It has been argued,
however, that the power of Congress under the exceptions clause
is limited by the very nature of the constitutional system and of
the judicial power. It has been urged by Professor Henry Hart
that the exceptions "must not be such as to destroy the essential role
of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan." 62
Professor Hart's test creates the difficulty of determining what
is the Supreme Court's "essential role." 63 In addition, that test
would make the Court itself the final arbiter of the extent of its
powers. Despite the clear grant of power to Congress in the exceptions clause, no statute could deprive the Court of its "essential role"; but that role would be whatever the Court said it was.
It is hardly in keeping with the spirit of checks and balances, however, to imply such virtually unlimited power into the Constitution. If the Framers intended to permit the Supreme Court to
define its own jurisdiction even against the will of Congress, it is
fair to say that they would have made that intention explicit.
Furthermore, the "essential role" test was advanced by Professor Hart in response to the suggestion that Congress could satisfy
61.

THE FEDERALIST

No.

80 (A. Hamilton).

62. See Hart, The Power to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953). See also Ratner,
supra note 32, at 200-01.
63. See Merry, supra note 28, at 54-57; Redish, Congressional Power to
Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause:

An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 906 (1982).
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the exceptions clause by removing all but a "residuum of jurisdiction," for example, by withdrawing appellate jurisdiction in
"everything but patent cases." 64 Whatever the cogency of Professor Hart's "essential role" test would be to a wholesale withdrawal of jurisdiction, if it were ever attempted by Congress, his
test cannot properly be applied to narrowly drawn withdrawals of
jurisdiction over particular types of cases. 65
If Congress were to make such wholesale "exceptions" to the
Court's appellate jurisdiction, so that there was little or nothing
left of that jurisdiction, it could be plausibly argued that such a
wholesale withdrawal of jurisdiction was not the making of "exceptions" at all and therefore was not authorized under the exceptions clause.6 6 The decision in such a case would have to be made
by the Supreme Court, and a constitutional crisis could result if the
Court and Congress were to persist in opposed positions on this
point. Significantly, however, the persistent support by the Supreme Court for John Marshall's "negative pregnant" theory indicates that even such a wholesale withdrawal of appellate jurisdiction
could be constitutional since that theory led to the Court's acceptance of the idea that the Court should exercise appellate
jurisdiction only in those cases in which Congress has specifically
granted it.
Even if a wholesale withdrawal of appellate jurisdiction from
the Supreme Court were to be unconstitutional as an interference
with the Court's "essential role," the same could hardly be said of
a pin-pointed withdrawal of appellate jurisdiction over a narrowly
defined class of cases, such as those involving school prayer or
abortion. It could hardly be argued that the "essential role" of
the Supreme Court depends on its exercising appellate jurisdiction
in every type of case involving constitutional rights. Such a contention would be contrary to the clear language of the exceptions
clause and to the consistent indications given by the Supreme
Court itself.
64. See Hart, supra note 62, at 1364.
65. Professor Hart acknowledges that his "essential role" theory has never
been addressed by the Supreme Court, but only because Congress has never
attempted a jurisdictional withdrawal audacious enough to justify its application. See id. at 1365.
66. Ratner, supra note 32, at 169. Professor Ratner argues that Congress'
power under the exceptions clause could never be so great as to permit it to
divest the Supreme Court of all appellate jurisdiction since, by definition, an
exception cannot nullify the general rule that the court "shall have appellate
Jurisdiction." Id. at 169, 171. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis
added).
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A. The Need for Uniformity and Supremacy
of Federal Law Arguments
Professor Hart's theory that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Could could not be limited beyond its "essential role" was later
expanded and given definition by Professor Ratner.6 7 The essential
role of the Court was defined by Ratner as providing for uniformity
of federal statutory and constitutional law and the supremacy of
federal law over state law.6 8 Under the supremacy clause of the
Constitution, the Constitution and the laws of the United States
"made in Pursuance thereof" are "the supreme Law of the Land." 19
Ratner argued that if the Constitution and federal laws are not
uniformly interpreted by one ultimate arbiter-the Supreme Courtthe supremacy principle will be reduced to a nullity because the
Constitution and the federal law will be at the mercy of local
courts. Constitutional rights will mean one thing in one state
and something else in another. The result, it is claimed, would be
a fragmentation of the Union. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
put it: "I do not think the United States would come to an end
if we [the Supreme Court] lost our power to declare an act of
Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we
could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several
states." 70
Alexander Hamilton expressed a similar concern:
If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a government being coextensive with its legislative, may be ranked among the
number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws, decides the question.
Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the
same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in
government from which nothing but contradiction and
71
confusion can proceed.

It should be remembered, however, that it was Hamilton who
argued in the same number of The Federalist that Congress' power
67. See generally Ratner, supra note 32; Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints
on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27
VIL. L. REV. 929, 941-55 (1982).

68. Ratner, supra note 32, at 160.
69. U.S. CONsT. art. 6, cl. 2. For the text of the supremacy clause, see
note 11 supra.

70. O.W.

HOLMES,

Law and the Court, in

295-96 (1920).
71. THE FEDERALIsT No.

80 (A. Hamilton).

COLLECrED

LEGAL PAPERS
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under the exceptions clause was a salutary means "to obviate and
remove" the inconveniences "resulting from the exercise of the
federal judicial power." 72
The argument that fundamental rights should not be allowed
to vary from state to state begs the question of whether there is a
fundamental right to uniformity of interpretation by the Supreme
Court on every issue involving fundamental rights. The supremacy
clause provides that the Constitution and the laws of the United
States are the supreme law of the land. The purpose of the clause
is to bind the states and their courts to follow the Constitution and
federal law. But there is no basis for reading the supremacy clause
to require uniformity of interpretation among the states on every
issue involving constitutional rights. The exceptions clause is
itself part of the supreme law of the land. Judging from what the
Supreme Court has said about it over the years, the Court accepts
the plain meaning of the exceptions clause. The Court evidently
regards the clause not only as an important element of the system
of checks and balances but also as granting wide discretion to
Congress in exercising power under it. There is, in short, a constitutional right to have the system of checks and balances maintained in working order. Without that system, the more dramatic
personal rights, such as speech, privacy and free exercise of religion, could quickly be reduced to nullities. This right to a
preservation of the system of checks and balances is itself one of
the most important constitutional rights.
If it be contended that the exceptions clause cannot be used to
deprive the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction in cases involving fundamental constitutional rights, it must be replied that
such a limitation can be found neither in the language of the
clause nor in its explications by the Supreme Court. Indeed, the
Supreme Court's conclusion, prior to 1891, that there was no
general right of appeal to the Court in criminal cases, surely involved the denial of the right to appeal in cases involving fundamental constitutional rights. 73

For what constitutional right is

more fundamental than the fifth amendment right not to be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law?
When it is argued that Congress cannot take away the Court's
jurisdiction to hear appeals involving fundamental rights, it must
be remembered that the various rights protected by the Bill of
Rights against federal encroachment have been made fully ap72 See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
73. See notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
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plicable against the state and local governments only through fairly
recent constructions by the Supreme Court itself34

Until the

adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, it was clear that
the protections of the Bill of Rights bound only the federal
75
government.
For nearly a century, the Supreme Court correctly interpreted
the fourteenth amendment so as to restrict the states only to a
limited extent.7 6 As Justice John Marshall Harlan described this
rule:
[O]ur function in reviewing state judgments under the
Fourteenth Amendment is a narrow one. We do not decide
whether the policy of the State is wise, or whether it is
based on assumptions scientifically substantiated. We can
inquire only whether the state action so subverts the fundamental liberties implicit in the Due Process Clause that
it cannot be sustained as a rational exercise of power. The
States' power to make printed words criminal is, of course,
confined by the Fourteenth Amendment, but only insofar as such power is inconsistent with our concepts of
'ordered liberty.' 77
Only in fairly recent years has the Supreme Court held that
the states are uniformly bound by all the protections of the Bill
of Rights as those protections are interpreted by the Supreme
Court.7 8

In the process, the Court has implied and defined new

constitutional rights in various areas, such as abortion and school
prayer. These rights are innovative creations of the Supreme
79
Court itself.
The argument that the Supreme Court cannot be deprived of
jurisdiction to hear appeals when they involve rights which the
Court has itself created, is an exercise in bootstrap jurisprudence.
It would make the Supreme Court not only supreme, but also
74. See, e.g,, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133 (1973) (abortion); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.

479 (1965) (access to contraceptives); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
(privilege against self-incrimination).
75. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
76. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977), ch. 8. See also

McClellan, Congressional Retraction of Federal Court Jurisdiction Over the
Reserved Powers of the States: The Helms Prayer Bill and a Return to First
Principles, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (1982).

77. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 501 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
78. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
79. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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absolutist in some of the most sensitive areas of our lives. Clearly,
the exceptions clause was designed to empower Congress to prevent
such a result.80
There are those who believe that it would be unwise for Con-

gress to exercise its exceptions clause power even with respect to a
single, narrowly drawn class of cases. But doubts as to the wisdom
of the exercise of a power cannot be translated into a denial of the
existence of the power. The members of Congress are entitled to
form their own judgments as to the wisdom of exercising the exceptions clause power in specific instances. The views of those who
doubt the wisdom of that exercise are to be seriously considered.
However, Congress' power to limit Supreme Court jurisdiction is
clearly affirmed in the Constitution itself. Those who are convinced that it is prudent and necessary to withdraw appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court in specified matters ought not to
be intimidated by those who wrongly contend that Congress does
not even possess that power.
It should be noted, however, that Congress, in its exercise of
the exceptions clause power, is not liberated from other constitutional prohibitions which restrict all its actions. It would seem
clear that Congress could not withdraw from the lower federal
courts or from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
jurisdiction, for example, "in any case where a Baptist shall be" a
plaintiff or an appellant. This would be unconstitutional, not
because the exceptions clause power is limited in itself, but because of a specific prohibition, elsewhere in the Constitution, which
restricts the exceptions power, the commerce power and every other
power of Congress. The religion of the appellant has nothing to
do with the nature of the case. Congress is forbidden by the first
amendment to prohibit appeals by Baptists or Jews-or to prohibit
their engaging in interstate commerce, or to in any other way
infringe the free exercise of religion. This does not mean, however, that there is any restriction on Congress' power to exclude
classes of cases, as determined by the nature of the case, from the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
It might be argued that the withdrawal of lower federal court
and Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in, for example, abortion
cases would be an unconstitutional denial of a remedy for viola80. See Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1001, 1005 (1965). Professor Wechsler sees the purpose of the exceptions clause
as to enable Congress to "strike at what it deems [to be] judicial excess."

Id. at 1005.
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tions of the right of reproductive privacy which the Supreme Court
has declared to be a fundamental right in relation to abortion.81
But this argument is without merit because the withdrawal of jurisdiction would leave untouched the right of recourse to the state
courts. These courts are no less obligated to enforce constitutional
82
rights than are the federal courts.
Nor could it be soundly argued that the withdrawal of jurisdiction in abortion cases would amount to a denial to a class-pregnant women who desire to have abortions-of the equal protection
of the laws which is implicitly guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
The equal protection guarantee, whether the explicit one in the
fourteenth amendment or the implicit one in the fifth, forbids only
"purposeful discrimination." 84 Such purposeful discrimination
could only readily be found in a withdrawal of jurisdiction in cases
where discrete and well-defined groups were precluded from access
to the Court. For instance, a statute which withdrew jurisdiction
only in those cases where "Baptists or blacks" were parties could be
found to be purposefully discriminatory. It is true, however, that
proof of purposeful discrimination can be shown by evidence of
the disproportionate impact of the law on the suspect class in question.8 The withdrawal of lower federal court and Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction would diminish-but not abolish-the legal
remedies available to pregnant women who seek abortions. It
could hardly be contended, however, that discrimination against
that class of women would be the purpose of such a withdrawal in
the way that discrimination against Baptists would be the purpose
of a withdrawal of jurisdiction in cases brought by Baptists. The
withdrawal of jurisdiction in abortion cases would be prompted
instead by other purposes: First, to restore legal remedies to unborn children who have been decreed to be non-persons by the
Supreme Court 86 and, second, to curtail the Supreme Court's continual excursion beyond its proper role in abortion cases. The
purposes of such legislation, then, would be to vindicate the rights

of a minority who are wholly deprived of rights by their definition
81. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133 (1973).
82. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
83. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
84. See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
85. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 253,
266 (1977).
86. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133 (1973).
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as non-persons, and to vindicate the separation of powers and the

system of checks and balances.
Those who would deny to Congress the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be

well advised to follow the course of Justice Owen J. Roberts. In
1949, as a retired Supreme Court Justice, he proposed a constitutional amendment to protect the Court against Congressional tampering with its appellate jurisdiction. His position was straightforward. He did not pretend that the power so clearly conferred
by the exceptions clause was somehow not there. Rather, he proposed to remove that power by constitutional amendment. 87 His
analysis and reasons are instructive:
Why did they [the Framers] then leave it to Congress
to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Court? I
think they did not envisage any such large federal judiciary as we have today. The federal judiciary was rather
in the background-that is, the lower judiciary. The
theory was that constitutional questions would arise in
state courts and then an appeal would come to the
Supreme Court from a decision of a state court on a constitutional question.
There came into play state pride, the states' rights
feeling, and another feeling that since Anglo-Saxons prize
the jury system, giving the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction as to matters of law and fact would give it the
opportunity to overturn jury verdicts, [and] jury decisions. . . . The best compromise that could be made in
the situation was to leave to Congress the right to define
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
You know what the result of that has been. The
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court depends upon
the judiciary acts-the original Judiciary Act passed in the
first session of Congress and the amendments that have
been adopted to it since-and Congress has set forth in
what cases the Supreme Court can entertain an appeal.
Very early the Court was faced with the question
whether it has a general appellate jurisdiction, modified
by what Congress had said on the subject. Chief Justice
Marshall, in two decisions, said that was not the way to read
the Constitution. He said that the Congress and the judiciary acts, having set forth in which cases the Supreme
Court might have jurisdiction on appeal, impliedly pro87. Roberts, Fortifying the Supreme Court's Independence, 35 A.B.A.J.

1 (1949).
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vided that it should not take jurisdiction in any other
class of cases.
That is the settled law and I think it is right. It remains, therefore, so far as we can see, that Congress could
affect the Court's powers, just as President Roosevelt could
have in his way, unless there was a popular uprising that
would frighten them out of doing what they threatened
to do." 88
IV.

EFFECT OF A WITHDRAWAL OF SUPREME COURT

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Unlike a constitutional amendment, withdrawal of the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction over a particular matter would not
actually reverse the Court's rulings on the subject.891 If Congress
were to withdraw the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in
school prayer cases, for example, that action would leave undisturbed the existing Supreme Court cases in that area. Lower
federal courts-if Congress had not removed their jurisdiction over
the issue as well-and state courts could regard themselves as bound
by those decisions as the last authoritative expression of the meaning of the first amendment, even though the Supreme Court could
no longer rule on the subject. The withdrawal of jurisdiction
would thus be a limited response to an erroneous Supreme Court
decision, and would have no permanent impact on the Constitution.
If experience showed the withdrawal to be unwise, it could be
readily repealed by a statute. Furthermore, an exercise of the exceptions clause power is forseeable only in matters in which the
Supreme Court's interpretations are so at variance with the sense

of Congress and the nation as to be regarded as usurpations. The
school prayer decisions, whatever else one may think of them, are
a classic example of judge-made law through which the Supreme
Court, by its own decree, has virtually amended the Constitution.
Most proposals to withdraw Supreme Court jurisdiction in
school prayer and abortion cases would also withdraw those cases
from the jurisdiction of lower federal courts. If, for a time, state
courts were allowed to make their own decisions in cases involving
88. Id. at 2-3.

89. But see Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REv. 929, 936-38
(1982). Professor Ratner argues that it is the power of the Supreme Court to
reverse decisions of the lower courts that binds the lower courts. Thus, once
the Court's appellate jurisdiction is excised, the lower courts, both federal and
state, would constitutionally be free to interpret the Constitution as they
saw fit. Id. at 937.
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school prayer, no great hardship would result. Presumably, at
least some of those courts would hold themselves bound by the
Supreme Court's decisions even though that Court could no longer
rule on the subject. Even so, there would at least be no opportunity for the Court to further extend its errors. For example, in
cases where supporters of the school prayer decisions sought to
extend them to outlaw evangelization efforts by individual students
outside of class time, those state courts would be apt to show a
gTeater measure of prudence than the Supreme Court has sometimes
shown on the subject.
Finally, it may be expected that some state courts would
openly disregard the Supreme Court precedents and would decide
in favor of allowing school prayer once the prospect of reversal by
the Supreme Court had been removed. That result would not be
such a terrible thing. It must be remembered that we are talking
about Supreme Court decisions which, in the judgment of the
elected representatives of the people and the President-or of twothirds of the Congress overriding his veto-are gravely erroneous
and urgently in need of correction. One healthy method of correcting those decisions would be for the people to trust in the state
courts for a time and thereby be protected against further excesses
in that area on the part of the Supreme Court. In the process, the
Court might learn a salutary lesson so that future excursions beyond
the Court's proper bounds could be avoided. Finally, because the
correction is statutory, rather than by constitutional amendment,
the Court's jurisdiction could readily be restored should the need
for it become apparent.
The withdrawal of jurisdiction on school prayer has been used
as an example in this discussion to illustrate the effects of a withdrawal of jurisdiction. Similar conclusions are appropriate with
respect to the withdrawal of jurisdiction in the school busing and
abortion cases. In the abortion area, urgency is lent to the issue
by the fact that at least 1,500,000 lives are taken by legalized
abortion each year in this country.9 0 This is equivalent to more
than the combined populations of Kansas City, Minneapolis and
Miami. While school prayer is a largely symbolic issue, abortion is
a life-and-death issue of enormous proportions. In view of its involving of the very right to live, it is a more important issue than
school prayer or "busing."
Roe v. Wade held that, whether or not the unborn child is a
human being, he is not a "person" for purposes of the fourteenth
90. See Chicago Tribune, March 11, 1982, at 8, col. 1.
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amendment." The holding is thus the same, in effect, as a pronouncement that an acknowledged human being is a non-person.
The case is thus a reincarnation, in a different context, of the
principle enunciated in the Dred Scott case.9 2 One would expect
the legal profession to be favorably disposed toward any attempt,
of at least arguable validity, to remedy such a ruling and the
consequences of it. Roe v. Wade, however, has been accepted with
equanimity by the organized bar.9 3 In addition, the general reaction of the organized bar to the proposals to curb the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction over abortion cases as well as on other
issues has been strongly negative.9 4 However, notwithstanding the
bar's general disfavor toward legislation limiting jurisdiction, the
life and death urgency of the abortion issue mandates the use of
whatever means available to focus attention on, and perhaps bring
changes to, the current law on abortion.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the eyes of some critics, the proposed Congressional exercise
of power expressly given to Congress by the Constitution is
viewed as a threat to the Constitution itself.9 5 Whatever its
outcome, however, the jurisdiction controversy will serve a useful
purpose if it illuminates several uncritical assumptions which
appear to underly the claim that the jurisdiction limiting proposals
are unconstitutional. The most important of the arguments against
the use of the exceptions clause power is based on an assumption of
judicial exclusivity and supremacy in the interpretation of the
Constitution. Implicit in this assumption is a belief that Supreme
Court holdings and opinions on constitutional issues have a status
equivalent to the language of the Constitution itself and that they
91. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
92. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
93. For example, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
resolved in 1978, "[t]hat the American Bar Association supports legislation on
the federal and state level to finance abortion services for indigent women."
A.B.A. House of Delegates, Summary of Action, August, 1978, 26. The
American Bar Association has a history of supporting abortion. "Generally,
it would appear appropriate for the American Bar Association, through any

or all of its functioning arms, to clearly go on record in support of the principles of personal freedom enunciated in the abortion cases." 1 A.B.A. SEC.
INDIVIDUAL RTS. &REsP. 812 (1973).
94. See, e.g., S. Taylor, Jr., A Worried Bar Fraternity, New York Times,
Jan. 25, 1982, p. 14, col. 1.

95. See id.
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What
can be corrected only by a constitutional amendment."
can
Court
seems to be overlooked is the fact that the Supreme
render an unconstitutional decision. In Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkin, 97 for example, Justice Brandeis described Swift v.
Tyson 98 as "an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts
of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of
opinion would make us hesitate to correct." It would be most
extraordinary if the Supreme Court, alone among the three branches
of government, were incapable of acting unconstitutionally. If the
Supreme Court has rendered an unconstitutional decision, why
should it be necessary to change the Constitution to rectify the
error? In his first inaugural address, Abraham Lincoln stated:
"[i]f the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting
the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
the people will have ceased to be their own
Supreme Court, ...
rulers, having to that extent practically resigned the government
into the hands of that eminent tribunal." 99 Fortunately, the exceptions clause was intended to provide, among other things, a
remedy for this problem.
96. It was not until 1958, however, that the Supreme Court itself ventured

to say that its interpretation of the Constitution "is the supreme law of the
land." See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
97. 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
98. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
99. American Historical Documents (Syrett, ed. 1980), 273.

